Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis by Acemoglu, Daron et al.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Departnnent of Economics
Working Paper Series
REEVALUATING THE MODERNIZATION
HYPOTHESIS
Daron Acemoglu
Simon Johnson
James A. Robinson
Pierre Yared
Working Paper 07-23
August 2007
Room E52-251
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Networl< Paper Collection at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011071

Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis^
Daron Acemoglu^ Simon Johnson* James A. Robinson^
Pierre Yared^
August 2007.
Abstract
This paper revisits and critically reevaluates the widely-accepted modernization hypothesis
which claims that per capita income causes the creation and the consolidation of democracy. We
argue that existing studies find support for this hypothesis because they fail to control for the
presence of omitted variables. There are many underlying historical factors that affect both the
level of income per capita and the likelihood of democracy in a country, and failing to control
for these factors may introduce a spurious relationship between income and democracy. We
show that controlling for these historical factors by including fixed country effects removes the
correlation between income and democracy, as well as the correlation between income and the
likehhood of transitions to and from democratic regimes. We argue that this evidence is consis-
tent with another well-established approach in political science, which emphasizes how events
during critical historical junctures can lead to divergent political-economic development paths,
some leading to prosperity and democracy, others to relative poverty and non-democracy. We
present evidence in favor of this interpretation by documenting that the fixed effects we estimate
in the post-war sample are strongly associated with historical variables that have previously been
used to explain diverging development paths within the former colonial world.
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1 Introduction
At the heart of comparative politics is an attempt to understand why different societies are
organized in different ways. Why are some societies democratic, while others are not? Why
do some societies develop modern effective nation states, while others do not? Why do some
societies experience revolutions, while others undertake more gradual change? And finally, why
are some societies relatively prosperous, while others are not?
Two distinct approaches to these questions have been popular in empirical social science. The
first focuses on the potentially causal channel from one of these variables, for example, income
per capita, to the rest. The second emphasizes that many of the key outcomes of interest covary;
at certain critical junctures societies make decisions that move them onto distinct development
paths and along these paths various outcomes coevolve.
The seminal example of the first approach is Seymour Martin Lipset's (1959) modernization
hypothesis. In Lipset's view, the level of economic development and variables closely associated
with it, such as the level of educational attainment and urbanization, drive institutional change.
They particularly shape the possibilities for the creation and consolidation of democracy.
The second approach, which we may refer to as the critical junctures hypothesis, is exemplified
by Barrington Moore's famous (1966) thesis that the reasons why Britain moved gradually to
democracy, Germany to fascism, and Russia to communist revolution are to be found in the
differential organization of agriculture and the differential intensities of feudal legacies. Not
only are the paths to the modern world through capitalist democracy, fascism, and communism
distinct from one another, but they are also initiated by differences during a certain critical
juncture, which in Moore's account is the end of the medieval world. Societies, like Britain,
where feudalism had collapsed most comprehensively moved onto a path of successful capitalist
development, prosperity, and democracy. Societies where the feudal legacy endured, such as
Russia, had a weak bourgeoisie, thwarted capitalism, backward agriculture, and eventually,
communist revolution. Other studies which share a similar methodological approach include
Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Collier and Colher (1991), Scully (1992), Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001,2002), Mahoney (2002), as well as the essays
in Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth (1992) and Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003).
Despite the appeal of the critical junctures hypothesis in many country studies, the modern-
ization hypothesis and Lipset's work have been much more infiuential in the empirical political
and social science literatures. Most importantly, the research on the creation and consolidation
of democracy has stayed close to Lipset's causal scheme and investigated the role of income per
capita and other socio-economic factors in accounting for variation in measures of democracy.

Most of this work has concluded that there is a causal effect of income per capita, prosperity
or modernization on democracy or democratic consohdation. Examples of this work include
Londregan and Poole (1996), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Barro (1997, 1999), Przeworski,
Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000), Boix (2003), and Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen,
and O'Halloran (2006 ).i
In this paper, we demonstrate that the evidence supporting this conclusion and the mod-
ernization hypothesis is much weaker than the previous work claimed or presumed. Instead, we
present evidence consistent with the existence and importance of critical junctures.
Most previous work on the determinants of democracy uses cross-sectional regression analysis
in order to investigate the causal relationship between income and democracy.^ However, to
the extent that there is any validity to the critical junctures hypothesis, one would want to
control for common variables affecting income and democracy. After all, not all correlation is a
manifestation of a causal relationship. The simplest way of accomplishing this is to investigate
the relationship between income and democracy in a panel of countries and to control for fixed
effects. Controlling for fixed effects is not only a simple and transparent strategy, but is also in
the spirit of the critical junctures hypothesis, since it takes out the effect of constant, potentially
historical, factors.
Our first finding in this paper is that once fixed effects are introduced into standard re-
gressions of democracy, the positive relationship between income per capita and democracy
disappears.'^ Our main results then show that high levels of income per capita do not promote
transitions to democracy from non-democracy, nor do they forestall transitions to non-democracy
from democracy. Our findings are robust across different measures of democracy, the use of ad-
ditional covariates, econometric specifications and estimation techniques. An important aspect
of our result is that controlling for fixed effects removes omitted factors affecting both income
and democracy, and this removes the influence of income per capita both on transitions away
from democracy and transitions to democracy.
In addition to a hnear specification, which we use to investigate both the effect of income
^Przeworski et al. (2000, p. 89) focus on the effect of income on the consolidation of democracy rather
than hkehhood of democracy or the creation of democracy. They use Lipset's phrase "this means that the more
well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset, 1959, p. 75) to justify their
claim that Lipset was connecting income par-capita only to democratic consolidation, as they do. Nevertheless,
elsewhere in the article Lipset claims that higher income per-capita both creates and consolidates democracy. For
example, (p. 83) "Increased wealth is not only related causally to the development of democracy..." See also his
discussion on p. 102 about whether Latin America will become democratic, where it is clear that he is talking
about economic development causing countries to become more democratic.
"Among the papers mentioned above only Londregan and Poole (1996) include fixed country effects in their
analysis. However, they fail to include time effects, and despite using annual data, they do not correct for serial
correlation in the residuals. Their results are sensitive to these choices (see Section 6).
^For similar results focusing on the relationship between income and the level of democracy, see Acemoglu,
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2007).

per capita on the level of democracy and on transitions, we develop and implement a double
hazajrd model for the simultaneous estimation of transitions to democracy and transitions away
from democracy. Though a major focus of political science research on democratization has been
the study of transitions to and away from democracy, the econometrics of transition models is
not entirely straightforward. Specifically, one cannot look at transitions to democracy or away
from democracy as separate events because whether or not an observation finds itself in the
at-risk sample is endogenously determined. We develop a framework to deal with this issue
which allows for the incorporation of fixed effects in a straightforward and intuitive way, and we
find that income per capita conditional on the fixed eflfect does not predict either transitions to
democracy or transitions away from democracy.
Our initial results refer to the most-commonly used sample period of 1960-2000. One might
argue, along the lines of Boix and Stokes (2003) , that this post-war sample misses the democrati-
zation of much of Western Europe and North America in the late nineteenth century. Motivated
by this concern, we also look at the relationship between income and democracy for a balanced
sample during the period 1875-2000. Again we do not find a significant relationship between in-
come and democracy once we control for fixed effects. Moreover, using our double hazard model,
we also do not find a significant relationship between income and transitions to democracy or
transitions away from democracy.
These empirical results show that while the level of per capita income and the level of
democracy are correlated, there is no relationship between the change in income per capita and
the change in democracy over the past 150 years. Interestingly, this point was made some time
ago by O'Donnell (1973, p. 6) who noted in his discussion of the existing empirical literature on
modernization that
"the data used refer to a set of countries at a single point in time, while the
postulated relationship refers to changes over a period of time in each of the countries
... The attempt to substitute "horizontal" data referring to many countries ... for this
"longitudinal data" and still say something about causal, time-spanning processes
within each unit [is a] fallacy.""*
In essence, the finding that income per capita causes democracy comes only from the cross-
sectional variation in the data. It is exactly this cross-sectional variation that fixed effects re-
move, and fixed effects estimators essentially exploit the within variation called for by O'Donnell
^Przeworski et al. (2000, p. 99) object to O'Donnell's study of how increasing income per capita in Argentina
induced a coup on the grounds that he "studied a country that turns out to be a distant outlier" . Our empirical
work shows that the patterns isolated by O'Donnell in the Southern Cone of Latin America are actually consistent
with data from both the postwar era and throughout the 20th century.

by looking at the relationship between changes in income and changes in democracy. It is im-
portant to note that using fixed effects is not the same as looking at transitions, for example as
in the work by Przeworski et al. (2000). Przeworski et al. (2000) find a relationship between
income per capita and the propensity for coups because their key right-hand side variable is still
the level of income, and thus they are documenting that richer democracies have fewer coups.
Consequently, their econometric strategy does not deal with omitted variables affecting both
democratization and economic growth, and these findings estabhsh neither the presence of a
causal effect of income on the likelihood of coups nor provides any evidence that democracies
that become richer experience fewer coups.
Figures 1 and 2 provide a simple diagrammatic illustration of these point. Both figures
use Przeworski et al.'s data and focus on the sample of democracies in every five year interval
between 1955 and 1990. We then observe which of these democracies experience a coup five
years later. In Figure 1, we group observations depending on whether log income per capita
is above or below the average log income per capita in the world for the observation year, and
we calculate the fraction of democracies in each group which experienced a coup. This figure
corresponds to regressions without controlling for fixed effects, and consistent with Przeworski et
al.'s findings, it shows that democracies with low income per capita are more likely to experience
a coup than democracies with high income per capita. Figure 2, on the other hand, provides
a visual representation of the patterns once we take out some of the time-invariant omitted
variables. To do this, we group observations depending on whether log income per capita is
above or below the average log income per capita for th.at country between 1955 and 1990.^
In contrast to Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that democracies that are poorer than usual are not
more likely to experience a coup. This figure therefore provides a preview of how the results
are likely to change once we control for omitted variables affecting both income and democracy.
Our empirical work will show in detail that the pattern shown in Figure 2 is very robust, and
this leads us to conclude that the empirical support for and the strong conclusions drawn from
the modernization hypotheses need to be reevaluated.
But if income does not cause democracy, then what does? The fact that including fixed
effects removes the correlation between income and democracy suggests that relatively time-
invariant, possibly historical factors are at the root of both the relative prosperity and the
relative democratic experience of some countries. In the second part of the paper, we discuss
whether, as emphasized by the critical junctures hypothesis, the relationship between prosperity
and democracy is underpinned by the divergent development paths of the countries in our
sample. We accomplish this by investigating whether the fixed effects estimated in the post-
^ Both of these values are demeaned from the world average to account for time trends.

war regressions are systematically related to historical variables associated with political and
economic divergence in history.
For this exercise, we focus on the sample of former European colonies, since for this sample
there is a specific theory of political and economic development related to divergent development
paths, and there is also data related to the determinants of these different paths during the
critical junctures facing these former colonies. In particular, we build on Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002) who exploit the quasi-natural experiment provided by the colonization
of many diverse societies by European powers after 1492. They show that the institutional
differences created at the critical juncture of European colonization persisted and significantly
contributed to the large differences in both the form of government (particularly the extent of
constraints on the executive) and the economic success of these societies. They also show that
the different paths of economic and political development are systematically related to a number
of historical variables which influenced the costs and benefits of different sets of institutions.
Institutional variation within the former colonies was influenced by the types of initial con-
ditions that the European powers encountered. In colonies where there were initially large
densities of indigenous peoples, where the mortality environment was unfavorable for European
settlements, and which were relatively prosperous, extractive institutions designed to transfer
rents to Europeans emerged. Such institutions did not create effective property rights except for
small minorities, they did not generate incentives for investment, education, or innovation, and
they consequently retarded economic growth. The political institutions in such societies were
complementary to the extractive economic institutions; they were coercive, hierarchical, and au-
thoritarian, aimed primarily at controlling indigenous populations, and focused on maintaining
and perpetuating a fundamentally unequal order. Since institutions have a tendency to persist,
the colonial economic and political institutions created in these extractive colonies persisted into
the 19th and 20th centuries and continued to benefit relatively small elites. These elites had a lot
to lose from democracy, not just because it would have directly taken away their formal political
power, but also because the change in the distribution of power would have undermined their
preferred set of economic institutions. Consequently, in these societies, elites were prepared to
fight harder to stop democracy (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Moreover, given that such
societies were based on relatively coercive institutions, elites were better able to repress those
who pushed for democracy, and subsequently, if democracy was conceded, they were better able
to undermine it by mounting coups. Therefore, the development path starting with extractive
institutions was nondemocratic and associated with relatively slow economic growth.
In colonies with different initial conditions, where there were few indigenous peoples, where
the disease environment was relatively benign for Europeans, and which were initially poor.

very different economic institutions emerged. Since there were few people to exploit and little
to extract from indigenous peoples, relatively non-coercive societies emerged. Such societies,
best exemplified by the settler colonies in North America and Australasia, developed economic
institutions providing most inhabitants access to land, secure property rights, and equality before
the law. They also quickly developed political institutions placing effective constraints on the
exercise of power. The incentives for investment and innovation in these societies paved the
way for economic growth. This situation is well illustrated by the development path of North
America, where already during the colonial period a relatively egahtarian society emerged with
representative cissemblies in each state where free adult males could vote.^ This institutional
nexus provided relatively good economic incentives for the non-slave population and provided
weaker incentives for the political elites to pursue strategies to block economic development or
undermine democracy. Moreover, these initial institutions implied that later political elites, even
when they tried, were unable to tilt the balance away from growth promoting and democratic
institutions.
We confirm the importance of the critical junctures emphasized in Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002) by showing that the fixed effects estimated in the post-war data are
very strongly related to factors linked to the past colonization experiences of these countries.
In particular, we show a very strong relationship between these fixed effects and the mortality
rates faced by European settlers, the indigenous population density before colonization, the
constraint on the executive at (or shortly after) independence, and the date of independence.
Settler mortality and indigenous population density before colonization proxy for the initial
conditions affecting the colonization strategy and the subsequent development path (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002); constraint on the executive at independence is the closest
variable we have to a direct measure of relevant institutions during the colonial period; and date
of independence is another measure of colonization strategy, since non-extractive colonies gained
their independence typically earlier than the extractive ones.
We also investigate the relationship between other variables, such as geography, religion and
ethno-linguistic fragmentation, on the propensity of a society to be democratic. Interestingly,
conditional on the historical variables related to the colonization strategy pursued by Europeans,
these variables seem to have no correlation with the fixed effects for democracy.
In addition to the papers already mentioned, our work is most closely related to Acemoglu,
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2007) who also investigate the relationship between income and
^Though slavery was important in the South, the key U.S. institutions were formed in the 17th century when
slavery was insignificant and at no time did slaves form more thcui 20% of the entire population. In contrast,
indigenous peoples formed 80-90% of the populations of Peru, Bolivia or Mexico, while slaves constituted more
than 90% of the population in most Caribbean islands (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997).

democracy. Despite the similarities between the two papers, there are also major differences.
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2007) focus on instrumental variable estimates of the
impact of income on democracy and also focus on the very long run relationship (between 1500
and 2000). The main innovations in the current paper include the focus on the modernization
hypothesis (and the contrast to the critical junctures hypothesis), the investigation of the re-
lationship between income and the dichotomous measures of democracy commonly used in the
political science literature, and most importantly, a detailed analysis of the relationship between
income and transitions to and away from democracy using a double hazard model. Our paper
is also related to a large literature empirically investigating the modernization hypothesis. We
discuss the relationship between our work in this literature in greater detail in Section 6.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data we use. In Section 3, we replicate
some of the basic regression results in the literature using pooled OLS, and in Section 4, we
show that the introduction of fixed effects into these models leads income per capita to become
completely insignificant. After having focused on results where the level of democracy is the
dependent variable we then move in Section 5 to consider various ways of measuring transitions
towards and away from democracy, and we develop a double hazard model which allows for
the incorporation of fixed effects. We find the same results. In Section 6, we discuss in detail
the relationship between our results and the existing research in the political science hterature.
In Section 7, we investigate our interpretation of the fixed effects regressions, and in Section
8, we examine our basic findings over the period 1875-2000, rather than 1960-2000. Section 9
concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We follow the existing empirical research in the way we measure democracy. Though there is
some controversy about how to exactly measure democracy, our strategy is to show that our
results are robust to any of the measures that are widely used in the literature. Our first measure
of democracy is the Freedom House Political Rights Index. This index ranges from 1 to 7, with
7 representing the least amount of political freedom and 1 the most freedom. A country gets
a score of 1 if political rights come closest to the ideals suggested by a checklist of questions,
beginning with whether there are free and fair elections, whether those who are elected rule,
whether there are competitive parties or other political groupings, whether the opposition plays
an important role and has actual power, and whether minority groups have reasonable self-
government or can participate in the government through informal consensus.^ Following Barro
(1999), we supplement this index with the related variable from Bollen (1990, 2001) for 1950,
^See Freedom House (2004), http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm

1955, 1960, and 1965. As in Barro (1999), we transform both indices so that they he between
and 1, with 1 corresponding to the most democratic set of institutions.
The Freedom House index, even when augmented with Bollen's data, only enables us to look
at the post-war era. The Polity IV dataset, on the other hand, provides information for all
countries since independence starting in 1800. Both to look at pre- 1940 events and as a check
on our main measure, we also use the composite Polity index, which is the difference between
the Polity's Democracy and Autocracy indices.^ The Polity Democracy Index ranges from to
10 and is derived from coding the competitiveness of poUtical participation, the openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. The Polity
Autocracy Index also ranges from to 10 and is constructed in a similar way to the democracy
score. To facilitate comparison with the Freedom House score, we also normalize the composite
Polity index to lie between and 1.
Both of these measures enable us to distinguish between different shades of democracy. An
alternative empirical approach has been defended and used by Przeworski and his coauthors
(Przeworski et al., 2000, chapter 1), who argue that a simple dichotomy between democracy
and non-democracy is the most useful empirical definition. Dichotomous measures may also be
better suited to analyses of transitions from and to democracy. Therefore, we present results
using the Boix-Rosato dataset which extends the Przeworski et al. (2000) in which the index
equals 1 if a country is a democracy and equals otherwise. We also develop a simple double
hazard model to deal with the simultaneous modeling of transitions to and from democracy. All
of these exercises using the dichotomous measures give very similar results to those using the
continuous measures.
We construct five-yearly and annual panels. For the five-year panels, we take the observation
every fifth year. We prefer this procedure to averaging the five-yearly data, since averaging
introduces additional serial correlation, making inference and estimation more difficult.^
In addition, we use GDP per capita data from the Summers-Heston dataset for the post-war
period (Heston, Summers, and Atten, 2002), GDP per capita data from Maddison (2003) for
the prewar and long samples, a measure of educational attainment from the Barro-Lee dataset
(average years of schooling for people in the population over the age of 25), and total population
from the World Bank (2002).
When we turn to the former European colonies sample, we obtain the date of independence
from the CIA World Factbook and the constraint on the executive after independence from the
*See Marshall and Jaggers (2004) and http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
^For the Freedom House data which begins in 1972, we follow Barro (1999) and assign the 1972 score to 1970
for the purpose of the five-year regressions. Moreover, we assign the 1994 score in the Boix-Rosato data to 1995
for the purpose of the five-year regressions.

Polity IV dataset.^'^ Population density in 1500 is calculated by dividing the historical measures
of population from McEvedy and Jones (1975) by the area of arable land (see Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson, 2002). Finally, data on settler mortality are from Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001), who constructed it based on research by Philip Curtin and other historians.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the key variables both for the whole world and for
former European colonies, the sample we focus on for some of the regressions. Throughout the
paper, we adopt the definition of former European colonies used in Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002), which excludes the Middle Eastern countries that were briefly colonized
by European powers during the 20th century. This definition is motivated by our interest in
former colonies as a sample in which the process of institutional development, in particular during
the 19th century and earlier, was shaped by European intervention (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2002). ^^
Table 1 shows that there is significant variation in all the variables for both the entire
sample and the former colonies sample. Countries in the former colonies sample are somewhat
less democratic and substantially (about 30 percent) poorer than the average country in the
whole sample.
3 Pooled Cross-Section Results
We first replicate the basic results in the literature using a pooled cross-sectional approach. The
first column of Table 2 reports estimates of the following simple linear regression model:
dit = ad,t-i + IVit-i + ^Jt + Vit (1)
where du is the democracy score of country i in period t. The lagged value of this variable on
the right hand side is included to capture persistence in democracy and also potentially mean-
reverting dynamics (i.e., the tendency of the democracy score to return to some equilibrium
value for the country). The main variable of interest is yn-i, the lagged value of log income per
capita. The parameter 7 therefore measures the impact of income per capita on democracy. In
addition, the /i^'s denote a full set of time effects, which capture common shocks to (common
^°The data on constraint on the executive from Polity begins in 1800 or at the date of independence. In our
former colonies sample only one country, the United States became independent before 1800. The United States
broke with Britain in 1776 and was recognized as the new nation following the Treaty of Paris in 1783. We code
the U.S. date of independence as 1800.
^^By the time the Middle East was colonized, the whole 'colonial project' was on the retreat. The European
powers had little influence on the institutions of these societies. In contrast, Latin American countries were
colonies for almost 300 years and the Spanish colonial state penetrated into all areas of life. Though most
African and Asian countries were not formally colonized until towards the end of the 19th century, they had been
experiencing the effects of European colonialism since the mid 17th century. For example, in Africa the Atlantic
slave trade took off in the first half of the 17th century and existing evidence suggests that this had a large impact
on institutions even before formal colonization.

trends in) the democracy score of all countries, and vu is an error term, capturing all other
omitted factors, with E {vit) = for all i and t. The sample period is 1960-2000 and time
periods correspond to five-year intervals.
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions of (1) will lead to consistent estimates of the para-
meter of interest, 7, when cov {dit-i,Vit) = cov {yit-i,Vit) = 0. In other words, OLS estimation
requires that there be no omitted variables correlated with the right-hand side variables in the
regression. ^^
The panel A of Table 2 uses the Freedom House data, panel B uses the Polity data, and
panel C uses the dichotomous Przeworski index to present pooled cross-sectional regressions of
democracy on income. All panels pool the time-series and cross-sectional variation. All standard
errors in the paper (unless indicated otherwise) are robust against arbitrary heteroskedasticity
in the variance-covariance matrix, and they allow for clustering at the country level. ^^
The regressions include one lag of democracy, one lag of log GDP per capita, and time
effects. The sample size varies because of data availability, and the panel is unbalanced. Lagged
democracy is highly significant and shows a considerable degree of persistence (mean reversion)
in democracy. Log GDP per capita is also significant and illustrates the well-documented positive
relationship between income and democracy. Though statistically highly significant, the effect
of income is quantitatively small. For example, the coefficient of 0.073 (standard error = 0.010)
in column 1 of panel A implies that a temporary 10 percent increase in GDP per capita is
associated with an increase in the Freedom House score of 0.0073, and a permanent increase
in GDP per capita by 10 percent is associated with an increase in the (steady state) Freedom
House score of 0.0073/(1-.703)~0.025. This effect is quantitatively small (for comparison, the
gap between the United States and Colombia today is 0.5).
Overall, the regressions in Table 2 confirm the main finding of the existing literature of
a positive association between income and democracy. While the earlier literature has typi-
cally interpreted this as the causal effect of income on democracy, we next show that such an
interpretation may not be warranted.
4 Panel Regressions with Fixed Effects
We now revisit the basic results of the last section in the panel set-up with fix;ed effects. In terms
of equation (1), the presence of fix;ed effects implies that the error term can be represented as
^^The fact that the democracy index takes discrete values induces a special type of heteroscedasticity, but
creates no difficulty for inference with OLS, as long as standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (e.g.,
Wooldridgc, 2002, Section 15.2).
^^ Clustering is a simple strategy to the correct the standard errors for potential correlation across observations
both over time and within the same time period. See for example Moulton (1986) or Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004).
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Vit = 5i + Uit, where now E (uu) = for all i and t. Taking this into account, the estimating
equation becomes:
dit = adu-i + jyu-i + Xu-if3 + fif + S^ + u^t, (2)
which differs from (1) because it includes a full set of country dummies, the (5i's, and because
we now allow for other covariates captured by the vector x^^_-^ with coefficient vector /3. The
country dummies capture any time-invariant country characteristic that affect the equilibrium
level of democracy.
The most important benefit of the fixed effect estimator is that, as well known, if the error
term takes the form vu = Sj, + uu, with the Si's, correlated with yu-i or xu-i, then pooled
OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. In contrast, even if cov{yit-i,di + uu) 7^ (or
cov (xj^_^^,Si + Uitj ^0 where xj^_-^ represents the j'th component of the vector x^t-i) but
cov {yit-i,Uit) = cov (x^^_-y,Uit j = for all j, then the fixed effects estimator will be consistent.
This structure of correlation is particularly relevant in this context, because the critical
junctures hypothesis suggests precisely the presence of historical factors affecting both political
and economic development.^^
In addition to the conceptual issues, there is also an econometric problem involved in the
estimation of (2). The regressor du-i is mechanically correlated with Uis for s < t, so the
standard fixed effects estimation is not consistent (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 11). However,
it can be shown that the fixed effects OLS estimator becomes consistent as the number of time
periods in the sample increases. Here, we start with the fixed effects OLS estimates, and then
consider various alternative estimation strategies to deal with this issue.
Table 2 column 2 presents our basic results using the Freedom House score (panel A), the
Polity score (panel B), and the Przeworski index (panel C). In none of the panels is income per
capita significant, and it typically has a very small coefficient. With the Freedom House data
the coefficient in 0.008 (for example, compared to 0.073 in column 1 of Table 2) with a standard
error of 0.034. With the Polity data in panel B, the estimate is basically zero, -0.003 (standard
error=0.038).
A potential concern with fixed effects regressions is that once fixed effects are included, there
may not remain enough variation in the right-hand side variables to obtain precise estimation. ^^
The results in Table 2 show that this is not the case in our empirical investigation. The standard
'^''Nevertheless, there should be no presumption that fixed effects regressions will necessarily estimate the causal
effect of income on democracy, for example because there are time varying omitted variables. See Accmoglu,
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2007) for instrumental variable strategies designed to estimate the causal effect
of income on democracy.
'^This issue is raised by a number of recent papers in the political science literature, debating the pros and
cons of the fixed effects methodology. See, for example, Green, Kim, and Yoon (2001) and the accompanying
symposium, as well as Beck (2001).
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errors of the estimates of the effect of income on democracy are relatively small. For example,
the standard error in column 2 of panel A of Table 2 is 0.034, compared to 0.010 in column 1. An
effect of income on democracy of the same size as in column 1 (0.073), which, as noted in Section
3, is itself quantitatively very small, falls just outside the two standard error confidence interval
of the fixed effect estimate. This shows that the lack of a positive effect of income per capita
on democracy when we control for time-invariant omitted variables is not driven by imprecise
estimates. Instead, it is likely due to the fact that these omitted variables are responsible for
the positive relationship that previous cross-sectional (or pooled cross-section and time-series)
studies have found. ^^
Furthermore, Figures 3-5 document that the lack of a significant relationship between income
per capita and democracy is not driven by some econometric problems or some unusual feature of
our data. Figures 3 and 4 plot the change in the Freedom House and Polity score for each country
between 1970 and 1995 against the change in GDP per capita over the same period. These
scatterplots correspond to the estimation of the fixed effects equation (2) in time differenced
form without any covariates other than contemporaneous income, and using only two data
points, 1970 and 1995 (these two dates are chosen to maximize sample size).^^ They show
clearly that there is no strong relationship between income growth and changes in democracy
over this period. Figure 5 performs a similar exercize using the Przeworski index. In contrast
to the continuous Freedom House and Polity scores, this index is dichotomous so that change in
democracy is either -1, 0, or 1. Therefore, we document the average change in democracy score
for countries grouped by income per capita growth quintile. This figure shows that there is no
relationship between the income per capita growth quintile and the change in the democracy
1 s
score.
These initial results show that once we allow for fixed effects, per capita income is not a major
determinant of democracy. The remaining columns of the table consider alternative estimation
strategies to deal with the potential biases introduced by the presence of the lagged dependent
variable discussed above.
Our first strategy, adopted in column 3, is to use the Generalized Method-of-Moments Es-
timator (GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This builds on the approach first
suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and uses second and higher order lags as instruments
""Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yarcd (2007) report similar results also instrumenting for income per-
capita using various different instruments. They show that the lack of a positive relationship documented here is
robust to these instrumental variables strategies.
'"^The regression of the change in Freedom House score between 1970 and 1995 on change in log income per
capita between 1970 and 1995 yields a coefficient of 0.032, with a standard error of 0.058, while the same regression
with Polity data gives a coefficient estimate of -0.024, with a standard error of 0.063.
'*We have also investigated whether the lack of a statistical association between income and democracy once
we condition on fixed effects is driven by some outliers in the data, and found no major outliers.
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under the assumption of no serial correlation in the residual, uu, in equation (2). With the
Arellano-Bond's GMM estimator, the coefficient on income per capita is now negative in all
panels.
Our second strategy, reproduced in column 4, estimates (2) with fixed effects OLS using
annual observations. This is useful since the fixed effects OLS estimator becomes consistent
as the number of observations becomes large. With annual observations, we have a reasonably
large time dimension. However, estimating the same model on annual data with a single lag
would induce significant serial correlation (since our results so far indicate that five-year lags
of democracy predict changes in democracy). For this reason, we now include five lags of both
democracy and log GDP per capita in these annual regressions. The table reports the p value
of an F-test for the joint significance of these variables. The results show no evidence of a
significant positive effect of income on democracy in any of the panels (while democracy is
strongly predicted by its lags, as was the case in earlier columns).
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 we add average years of schooling and population as additional
explanatory variables, and we repeat the regressions reported in columns 2 and 3 with very
similar results. In particular, income never has a positive effect on democracy, and interestingly
there is also no evidence of a positive relationship between education and democracy.
In addition, in regressions not reported here, we check for potential nonlinear interactions
between income and other variables, and we find no evidence of such relationships.
Overall, the inclusion of fixed effects proxying for time-invariant and country-specific char-
acteristics removes the entire cross-country correlation between income and democracy (and
education and democracy). These results shed considerable doubt on the conventional wisdom
that income has a strong causal effect on democracy.
5 Transitions to and from Democracy
In the previous two sub-sections we focused attention on the level of democracy as the dependent
variable. Much of the empirical literature since the work of Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and
Przeworski et al. (2000) has instead focused on estimating separate models for transitions to
and away from democracy. In this section we investigate whether the findings in this literature
are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects. We first investigate this question using a variety of
linear models. We then develop and implement a double hazard model for the simultaneous
estimation of transitions to democracy and transitions away from democracy. All of our various
econometric strategies show that once fixed affects are included to control for time-invariant
omitted variables simultaneously affecting both income and democracy, there is no evidence of
an effect of income per capita on transitions to or away from democracy.
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5.1 Linear Models
Standard analyses of transitions to and from democracy use dichotomous measures such as the
Przeworski/Boix-Rosato data. Here we start with a more straightforward, and to the best of
our knowledge novel, approach using the democracy scores in the Freedom House and Polity
data. Our strategy is to modify the model in equation (2) as follows:
df^ = adit-i + JVit-i + At-i^ + ^i^ + 5^ + uu (3)
for transitions to democracy and
d^^= adit-i + ^yu-i + X'(_i/3 + //< + ^i + Uit (4)
for transitions from democracy, where df^ = Taa,x{dit,dit-i} and d~^ = mm {da, da-i}.^^ This
procedure implies that for d^, we only consider upward movements on the democracy score, and
thus ignore declines in democracy. For d~^
,
we only consider deterioration in the democracy score.
This approach therefore enables us to study increases and decreases in democracy separately,
while still maintaining linearity.
Table 3 reports estimates of (3) while Table 4 reports estimates of (4). In both tables, panel
A uses the Freedom House data while panel B uses the Polity data. Panel C of both tables uses
the Przeworski dichotomous index where the formulas (3) and (4) also represent the model we
estimate. Columns 1-6 of these two tables are analogous to columns 1-6 of Table 2 with the only
differences being in the left hand side variable.
In the first columns of both tables we start with regressions without the fixed effects, the (5,:'s,
to replicate the results of the previous literature in our framework. The results in Table 3 using
the pooled OLS approach show that, surprisingly and contrary to the claims of Przeworski and
Limongi (1997), income per capita is positively associated with transitions to democracy. In line
with Elkins (2000), Table 3 shows that even the basic results of Przeworski and Limongi (1997)
are not entirely robust. In Table 4, we also find statistically significant correlations between
income and transitions away from democracy with all three types of data (note that a positive
coefficient in the transitions to non-democracy regressions means that higher income countries
are less likely to experience coups).
Our main results, which add fixed effects, are presented in column 2 of Tables 3 and 4.
The findings here are similar to those reported in Table 2. Once we introduce the fixed effects,
income per capita is never significant. In Table 3, the coefficient on income in panel A is
''Although (3) and (4) are nonhnear in da, they are hnear in the parameters and in particular, in the fixed
effects, the 5,'s. This implies that the fixed effects can be differenced out to achieve consistent estimation (without
creating an incidental parameters problem).
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similar to column 1, but no longer significant, whereas in Table 4 the coefficient is negative and
insignificant.
Column 3 of both tables then turns to GMM estimation of the models with fixed effects.
The estimates again show no evidence of an effect of income on either transitions to democracy
or away from democracy. In fact, the estimated impact of income per capita on the likelihood of
the transition to democracy or of remaining a democracy is negative in all specifications except
in panel C of Table 3.
In column 4 we turn to the alternative strategy of using annual data. We again report the
level of significance of an F-test on the joint significance of the lags of income per capita. The
general picture here is that income per capita is insignificant although in panel B of Table 3
using the Polity dataset the variables are jointly significant at the 11% level. The final two
columns of the table repeat columns 2 and 3 adding the same covariates as in Table 2 columns 5
and 6. The same message comes through here, once fixed effects are included income per capita
is insignificant. - •
The results are consistent with those reported in Section 4. Though with pooled OLS
the coefficient on income per capita is significant on transitions to and transitions away from
democracy, once we add fixed effects, income is never significant in any specification.
In summary, when we control for the presence of country-specific omitted factors, there is
little effect of income per capita either on transitions to democracy, or contrary to the emphasis
in Przeworski et al. (2000), on transitions away from democracy.
5.2 Nonlinear Models '
We have so far reported linear probability models of transitions to and away from democracy
rather than nonlinear models of transitions because they are more transparent, simpler, and
consistent under a weaker set of assumptions (see Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 15.2). Another
advantage of the linear probability model is that standard panel data techniques can be used
for consistent estimation in the presence of fixed effects (with large T). In contrast, because
the conditional mean function in a nonlinear model is not linear in the parameters, the model
with fixed effects cannot be estimated consistently (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002, chapter
15.8). This makes the linear probabihty model with fixed effects a natural starting point for the
analysis of transitions. Nevertheless, the political science literature and parts of the economics
literature focus on nonlinear models of transitions. Though more complicated and somewhat
more difficult to interpret, these nonlinear models also have advantages. In particular, they
provide a better approximation to the structural form that might be generating the data on
transitions to and away from democracy.
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We now develop and estimate a nonlinear double hazard model to measure the impact of
income on transitions to democracy and transitions away from democracy. The reason why
we need to turn to a double hazard model rather than use existing approaches relying on pro-
bit or duration model analysis is that transitions to democracy or away from democracy are
jointly determined events. They cannot be treated as separate events because whether or not an
observation finds itself in the at-risk sample is endogenously determined. Our modest method-
ological contribution here is to develop a framework to deal with this issue which also allows the
incorporation of fixed effects in a straightforward manner.
Our double hazard model can be expressed in terms of two conditional mean functions for
the probability of transitioning to democracy and the probability of remaining in democracy:^''
PT{d,t = l\du-i = 0,yit-ut) = $ (7^°^j/ii_i +mD (5)
Pr{d^t = l\du-l = l,y^t-l,t) = ^{J'''Syu-l + ^i^'), (6)
where $ is an increasing function with a range between and 1. Equation (5) describes the
probability that a dictatorship collapses (transitions to democracy), and equation (6) describes
the probability that a democracy survives, which is negatively related to the probability of a
coup (transitions away from democracy). Together, these two equations characterize the law of
motion of democracy for a given country, so that we can think of these equations as constituting a
"double hazard model" , The parameters 7^°* and 7"'^^ represent the effect of income on positive
and negative transitions respectively, and yu^"^ and /z"*^^ represent the time effects on positive
and negative transitions, respectively. Note that equations (5) and (6) model the appropriate
transitions to and away from democracy, but they do not yet introduce fixed country effects.
To make further progress, let us also assume that $ (•) is the normal cumulative distribution
function, so that the system described by (5) and (6) is an exponential double hazard model.
Since this system of equations characterizes the entire motion of democracy, it can easily be
estimated by maximum likelihood. ^^
Table 5 reports estimates of (5) and (6) using the Przeworksi/Boix-Rosato dichotomous
measures of democracy. Column 1 of Table 5 estimates (5) and (6) simultaneously on a balanced
^"instead of (6), we could have alternatively written
Pr {d.t =
I
du-i = 1, y^t-l,t) = * ir^'yu-i + P-T') ,
in which case we would have
Pr(d., = 1
I
d,t_i = l,yit~i,t) = 1 - * {T"'y^t-l + nT')
While these two specifications are econometrically equivalent, the interpretation of the parameters 7"'^® and /i"*^^
is less intuitive, making us prefer the system of equations given by (5) and (6).
^The likelihood function is straightforward to compute. For example, for a given country i, we have that
Pr{d,i,...,d,T|2/io,...,J/2T-i} = 'Pr {d^T\d^T-l,y^T-l,T} X Y>r {diT-\\dtT-2,yiT-2,T - 1} ... X Pr{d,i|d,o,2/zO, !}•
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panel and reports the estimates of the marginal effect of lagged income. ^^ In panel A, we
constrain 7^°** = 7"''^ and ;uf°'' = /lx""^^. The estimates show a significant (cumulative) effect of
income per capita on transitions to and away from democracy. In panel B, we allow 7''°* ^ ^'^^9 ^
while still constraining /Uj"'* = /^""^^ . This is useful as a check of whether the impact of income
differs in the two equations as emphasized by Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Przeworski
et al. (2000). Income per capita is significant for both transitions to and transitions away
from democracy, though the coefficient on transitions away from democracy is higher and more
significant, which is in line with the basic finding of these works. In panel C, we estimate the
most flexible specification with 7^°* 7^ 7""^^ and ;if°* 7^ m"''^- The estimates are again similar.
The major problem of the double hazard model, like all other models that are nonlinear in
parameters, is that it cannot accommodate fixed effects. For example, if fixed effects are added,
the right hand side of equation (5) changes to $ {'J^^'^yn^i + M?"* + (5^°*), and the right hand
side of equation (6) changes to $ {"i^^^yu-i + m""^^ + ^Y^)^ where the 6i& are the fixed effects
for observation i. This specification creates an incidental parameters problem in the estimation
of the (5i's (because the number of parameters to be estimated increases at the same rate as
the number of observations in the cross-section). This incidental parameters problem makes
consistent estimation impossible. One solution to this problem is suggested by Mundlak (1978)
and Chamberlain (1980), and it involves imposing a functional form on the (5j's. Specifically,
Chamberlain (1980) posits that
Pr (6\ = 5 I j/ii, -yrT) = $ {a^ + y,P'') , 3 = pos, neg (7)
where a^ and /3 are exogenous parameters, and yj is the average of yir-i for r = 1, ..., T. The
important assumption is that the component of 5j which is uncorrelated with y^ will be random
in that it will not be correlated with du. As a consequence, we can write (incorporating the
constant term a^ into the time effects /Uj)
Pr{d^t = l\du-i=0,yu-i,t) = $(7P°V.*-i+Mr+y.i9^") (8)
Piid,t = l\du-i = l,yu-i,t) = ^{J^'^>^yu-l + ^l^ + y^W'"') (9)
This specification is less flexible than including a full set of fixed effects, which was our strategy
in the linear models, because it imposes considerable amount of structure on how unobserved
heterogeneity (omitted time-invariant factors) affects democratic transitions. Consequently, this
specification makes it less likely that we will be able to fully control for the effect of omitted
variables simultaneously affecting income and democracy. Thus it makes it more likely that we
^^As is typically the case in studies like this we focus on a balanced panel. Our results do not change if we
instead modify the exercise to consider an unbalanced panel. Details available upon request.
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may still find a spurious positive effect of income on transitions to and away from democracy.
Nevertheless, column 2 of Table 5 shows that even with this more restrictive Chamberlain hazard
model, there is no effect of income per capita on transitions to or away from democracy. Once
again, in panel A, we constrain 7^°* = 7"''5, ynf'"* = ^x^'^^ , and /3^°'' = /j"'"^^. In panel B, we
allow 7^°*' ^ 7"*^^ but we constrain /l/j°* = jif'^^ and ^°* = fS'^"^ . In panel C, we allow
-ypo*
^
ry^ieg
^
^pos
_^ ^^^3 ^ and /3 ^ /3 . In all of these panels, the effect of income per capita
is reduced and is insignificant. Overall, there is no evidence that income per capita has a causal
effect on transitions to or away from democracy once we include controls for omitted variables
simultaneously affecting the evolution of income and democracy.
Columns 3 and 4 are analogous to columns 1 and 2 on an annual balanced sample, and
achieve similar results. Column 5 adds lagged population and lagged education to the sample
of columns 1 and 2, where the averages of lagged population and lagged education are used in
the calculation of (7), and again, income per capita has no effect on transitions to democracy
or transitions away from democracy.
These results thus establish that the source of the difference between our results and those
of Przeworski et al. (2000) are due to the presence of fixed effects, and are not related to
differences in the measures of democracy or estimation methods. All in all, the results in
the last two sections show that no matter what estimation approach one takes, controlling
for omitted variables simultaneously affecting income and democracy-either by including a full
set of fixed country effects or by using the parameterized approach of Chamberlain, 1980-
removes the empirical relationship between income per capita and democracy. These results
shed considerable doubt on the existence of a causal effect of income on democracy which has
been the plinth of modernization theory for almost 50 years. -
6 Comparison to the Existing Literature
The empirical results we present in this paper stand in contrast to the conventional wisdom and
the previous literature. In this section we discuss in more detail why our results differ.
Beginning with Lipset (1959) most scholars have adopted a simple empirical strategy to
evaluate the determinants of democracy. Much cited papers by Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979),
and Muller (1995) look for the cross-sectional relationship between per capita income and other
covariates and some measure of democracy. In such studies, a particular date is chosen, and
each country constitutes one observation. An advance over these approaches was the addition
of time-series data in the paper by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) who pooled time-series
data with cross-sectional data. This latter approach is common in many contemporary studies
(Barro, 1997, 1999, Ross, 2001, Fish, 2003). That our results are different from this literature is
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not very surprising given that these papers do not investigate the possibiUty that the correlation
between income and democracy may be generated by omitted variables affecting both variables.
The results we have presented so far make it clear that the source of difference between our
findings and these studies is the presence of fixed effects in our models. Both because there are
likely to be many potential omitted factors, and also because the alternative critical junctures
hypothesis emphasizes the importance of time-invariant historical factors, we believe that a fixed
effects specification is more appropriate, and that our results are likely to be closer to the causal
effect of income on democracy.^^
Several more recent empirical studies have used dynamic probit models to investigate the
determinants of transitions to and away from democracy. Przeworski et al. (2000), Boix (2003),
Boix and Stokes (2003), Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O'Halloran (2004) and
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004), for example, find a positive relationship between income
and democracy using such an approach (though Przeworski et al., 2000, emphasizes the effect
of income on coups rather than on democratizations) . As the last sub-section documented, the
critical difference is that these previous empirical specifications do not include fixed effects and
do not control for other cross-country differences potentially affecting income and democracy.
Another important and infiuential paper relevant to our investigation is Londregan and Poole
(1996), which is the only paper we are aware of that estimates models of democracy with fixed
effects. A natural conjecture would have been that their results would parallel ours. However,
they also report positive and significant effects of income on democracy. Although Londregan
and Poole (1996) use maximum likelihood estimation in a two-equation model, their equation
for democracy is basically linear. Appendix Table A2 reports their basic result in column 1,
together with our linear estimation of their model in column 2.^^ The estimates are very close,
in fact practically identical, to those in their original paper. In column 3, we omit Londregan
and Poole's "transition" variable, which is an index giving a value of 1 to countries with missing
lagged democracy values, making their specification more comparable to ours.^^ This shows
that the results do not change much as a result of this exclusion.
So why are these estimates so different from our results in the previous tables? The answer
is twofold. First, Londregan and Poole (1996) estimate their model on annual data, but do
not correct the standard errors for the serial correlation in the residuals. Second, they do not
"'in fact, to the extent that there are time-varying omitted variables, we would expect changes in these omitted
variables to have a positive effect on both income and democracy, so that even fixed effects estimators may lead to
results that are upwardly biased. Therefore, one may want to interpret our results as providing an upper bound
on the causal effect of income on democracy.
^''We use their data, both to increase comparability (there have been revisions to the data since then), and also
to include the additional variables they have put together.
"^Our results are similar if we do not drop the transition variable, and in column 5 add five lags of this variable
together with five lags of GDP per capita and democracy.
19

include time effects. Lack of time effects in tfieir models implies that their estimate of the
effect of income may partly pick up the common trend in democracy and income. Equally
important, their standard errors are significantly biased downward because of serial correlation
in the residual. ^^ Column 4 adds a full set of time effects, and corrects the standard errors by
clustering on country. Now, log income per capita is no longer significant, though it continues to
be positive. However, this positive estimate is also difficult to interpret, since the regression also
includes income per capita growth, which is estimated to have a negative coefficient. For this
reason, in column 5, we estimate their equation in line with our annual regressions (column 4 in
Table 2), including five lags of democracy and five lags of income per capita (which is naturally
much more flexible than including the one lag and two growth terms). Now, all of the income
terms are insignificant. We therefore conclude that Londregan and Poole's (1996) results are
also consistent with ours.
7 Understanding the Fixed Effects Results
In the introduction, we argued that the fixed effects results are consistent with the hypothesis
that the (long run) political and economic development paths of societies are intimately linked.
Political institutions and the distribution of resources in a society determine the distribution of
political power which then influences both the economic institutions today and the evolution
of future political institutions. Economic institutions, in turn, determine both the aggregate
economic performance of the society and how its resources will be distributed. There is therefore
a natural complementarity between political and economic institutions. Economies grow if their
economic institutions encourage investment and innovation, for example, by providing secure
property rights and equality before the law; but this can only happen when those controlling
political power (the political elites) are constrained. We should thus expect democracy to be
associated with economic institutions that foster growth. Moreover, if events at some critical
juncture create a divergence in the political and economic institutions of a set of societies, we
may expect these differences to persist over time; some of these societies may embark on a path
to high income and democracy, while others experience relative stagnation and non-democracy.^^
According to this theory, the paths of economic and political development are intertwined.
^^To see why this is an important concern, consider a hypothetical dataset in which wc have minute-by-minute
data on democracy and income. Since the number of observations in this dataset would be near infinite, the
standard error estimates without correcting for serial correlation would be essentially equal to zero and any
estimated coefficient would be highly significant. However, it is clear that the standard errors are not really equal
to zero in this case, because democracy and income from one minute to another are not independent observations;
they are highly serially correlated. To obtain an unbiased estimate of the variance-covariance matrix, one needs
to allow for an arbitrary pattern of serial correlation by country, which is what clustering achieves.
"'See the discussion of the role of critical junctures in Collier and Collier (1991).
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and we expect democracy and income to evolve jointly. Nevertheless, conditional on a given
development path, economic growth does not necessarily lead to democratization.^* This rea-
soning suggests that the fixed effects estimated in the previous section should be closely linked
to the underlying institutional development paths and to the factors affecting what type of path
a society has followed. We now investigate this question.
7.1 Divergent Development Paths Among the Colonies
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) document that factors aflFecting the profitability
of different institutional structures for European colonizers had a major impact on early institu-
tions and on subsequent political and economic development in former European colonies. Based
on their ideas, we expect countries with high rates of settler mortality and higher indigenous
population density in 1500 to have experienced greater extraction of resources and repression
by Europeans, and consequently to be less democratic today. However, both population density
in 1500 and European settler mortality rates are subject to a large amount of measurement
error, and they are only some of the influences on the ultimate choice of development path. For
example, for various reasons, Europeans opted for extractive institutions in many areas, such
as Brazil, with low population density. Therefore, a direct measure of institutions immediately
after the end of the colonial period is also useful to gauge the effect of the historical develop-
ment paths on current outcomes. For this reason, we look at the measure of constraint on the
executive from the Polity IV dataset right after independence for each former colony, measured
as the average score during the first ten years after independence. This is the closest variable
we have to a measure of institutions during colonialism. We normalize this score to a to 1
scale like democracy, with 1 representing the highest constraint on the executive. ^^ Finally, we
also control for the date of independence. This is useful because constraint on the executive
at different dates of independence may mean different things. In addition and potentially more
importantly, countries where Europeans settled and developed secure property rights and more
democratic institutions typically gained their independence earlier than colonies with extractive
institutions. Another important effect of the date of independence on political and economic
development might be that former colonies undergo a relatively lengthy period of instability
after independence, adversely affecting both growth prospects and democracy.
"Similarly, there is no natural presumption that, conditional on a particular development path, a temporary
improvement in the democracy score should lead to higher incomes.
'^For example, Peru had a constraint on the executive score equal to 0.33, while the United States's score was
1 at independence. Those numbers are clearly indicative of the institutions that these countries had within the
colonial period itself.
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7.2 Historical Variables and Fixed Effects
Our basic results with the former colony sample are in Table 6. Table 6 has three panels
which take the fixed effects from our basic fixed effects OLS regressions in Table 2, column
2. As a caveat, we remind the reader that in the regressions in Table 2, the fixed effects are
not consistently estimated, because the time dimension, T, is small. Therefore, these results
should only be interpreted as suggestive of a general pattern. The first column of panel A
shows that the fixed effect for the level of democracy using the Freedom House measure of
democracy is negatively correlated with population density in 1500. The higher was historical
population density, the lower is the fixed effect today. Population density is highly significant
with a t-statistic of almost 4. In the column 2 panel A we then investigate the effect of settler
mortality. This again has the expected sign and greater historical mortality of European settlers
is negatively associated with the democracy fixed effect. Column 3 then introduces our two
variables which should capture historical institutions more directly. The results in this column
show that greater constraint on the executive at independence is significantly associated with
a greater fixed effect, and a more recent independence date is significantly associated with a
lower fixed effect. In column 4 we include all of the historical variables. When we do so, settler
mortality loses significance, and so in column 5 we include just the three significant variables
from column 4. The historical variables are highly significant with the expected signs and explain
63% of the variation in the fixed effects.
The robustness of the relationships found in Table 6 can be illustrated with scatterplots.
In Figures 6-9 we plot the fixed effect from Table 2 column 2 panel A against the four histor-
ical variables. These figures show that there are distinct relationships between these historical
variables and the fixed effects which strongly supports our interpretations of our findings.
Panels B and C of Table 6 are similar to panel A and examine the fixed effects from regres-
sions which use Polity and Przeworski measures of democracy. The results are very similar to
those in panel A. The historical variables are all jointly significant but not always individually
significant. The main difference is that population density loses significance when it is included
with constraint on the executive and independence year when we consider the Przeworski mea-
sures of democracy.
Many other time-invariant slow-moving characteristics of a society may also influence its
propensity to be democratic. In Table 7, we investigate whether some obvious candidates might
be responsible for some of our findings and whether they alter the explanatory power of our
historical variables in the sample of former colonies. In particular, we add a number of additional
control variables to the three regressions from column 5 of Table 6. In each panel, we report
the coefficient or the F-test for significance of the additional variables, and at the bottom, we
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report the F-test for the joint significance of our historical variables from Table 6 to demonstrate
the robustness of the findings there (we do not report the coefficient of each of these historical
variables to save space).
Many scholars have argued that countries formally colonized by the British inherit a culture
more compatible with democracy (Weiner, 1987, MuUer, 1995). Column 1 of Table 7 investigates
this issue by adding a set of dummy variables capturing the identity of the colonial power. None
of these variables are individually significant (the coefficient estimates are not reported to save
space) and an F-test also reveals that they are jointly insignificant in all of the three regressions.
Contrary to these widespread views in the literature, there is no evidence here that having been
colonized by the British relative to some other power tends to promote democracy, facilitate
democratizations, or reduce the propensity of a society to experience coups. '^'^ When these
colonial dummies are added the impact of the variables proxying for the determinants of the
development path is unchanged.
Another popular argument points to religion as an important determinant of political devel-
opment, suggesting that countries whose population is predominantly Muslim are less likely to
be democratic (e.g. Huntington, 1991, Fish, 2002). Column 2 investigates this issue by adding
the proportions of the population that are Catholic, Protestant and Muslim. As with variables
capturing colonial origins, there is no evidence here that religion influences the democracy fixed
effect in the sample of former colonies."'^ None of the individual coefficients are significant and
an F-test again shows them to be jointly insignificant.
Column 3 adds the absolute value of latitude (distance from the equator), a popular proxy
for geographic effects on economic development, and shows that latitude is insignificant and does
not alter the joint impact of the historical variables. Column 4 then examines the significance of
a dummy variable which captures whether or not the country is a major oil producer. It has been
widely argued in political science that countries dominated by natural resources tend to be less
democratic (Ross, 2001), though recent work contests this (e.g.. Dunning, 2007). This variable is
'"This is despite the fact that there appears to be an oft-emphasized correlation between democracy and
having been a British colony. Britain became a colonial power later than Spain and Portugal and even the
Netherlands. When it finally expanded into the world many of the places which were promising colonies, such as
Latin America, were taken. Thus, by being a latecomer, Britain was forced to colonize what at the time appeared
relatively unappealing places to colonize, such as the United States or subsequently Australia. It was precisely
these relatively unattractive places which had initial conditions which did not lend themselves to the creation of
extractive colonics. But it was not because it was colonized by the British that led the United States to become
democratic, but rather how the initial conditions moulded the formation of institutions. Once the influence of
these initial conditions is controlled for, there is no additional positive effect of British colonization on democracy.
'''A dummy variable denoting whether the fraction of the population which is Muslim exceeds 20% is nevertheless
significant if population density is excluded. Note that religion might still be an important determinant of the
development path in the entire world sample without being important in the former colony sample. In addition,
since these results are for a set of former European colonies which exclude the Middle East, our results cannot
convincingly settle the issue of the relationship between Islam and democracy.
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also not significant in any panels of the table. Finally we examine the impact of ethnolinguistic
fragmentation. The final column of Table 7 shows that conditional on the historical variables,
greater ethnolinguistic fragmentation is negatively correlated with the fixed efTects in panel A,
though it is only statistically significant when we use the Freedom House measure of democracy.
In all panels, the addition of this variable has no impact on the significance or explanatory power
of our historical variables.
Overall, this section has provided evidence that is consistent with our interpretation of the
fixed effects results as capturing the effect of time-invariant, historical variables simultaneously
affecting the evolution of income and democracy. It has documented that various historical
variables that proxy for the factors influencing the subsequent evolution of institutions in former
European colonies are closely related to the fixed effects from the democracy regressions. This
pattern is consistent with the general thrust of the critical junctures hypothesis.
8 Democracy and Income in the Long Run
We have so far followed much of the existing literature in focusing on the post-war period, where
the democracy and income data are of higher quality. Nevertheless, it is important to investigate
whether the relationship between income and democracy emerges only over a longer period of
time. This is of interest because when Lipset (1959) formulated modernization theory in the late
1950s, he probably had in mind the connection between industrialization, income growth, and
democracy that seemed to characterize the development experiences of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. This point is emphasized by Boix and Stokes (2003), who argue that
the post-war sample misses the democratization of much of Western Europe and North America
in the late nineteenth century.
Although historical data are typically less reliable, the Polity IV dataset extends back to
the beginning of the nineteenth century for all independent countries, as does the Boix-Rosato
extension of Przeworski et al.'s dataset, and Maddison (2003) gives estimates of income per capita
for many countries during this period. We therefore construct a data set starting from 1875,
where we study the data in 25 year intervals in order to maximize the cross-section of countries
which can be observed. We construct a balanced panel of countries for which democracy, lagged
democracy (calculated 25 years earlier), and lagged income (calculated 25 years earlier) are
available for every 25th year between 1875 and 2000.'^'^ The result is a sample of 25 countries for
^^For reasons of data availability, we assign income per capita in 1820 to 1850, income per capita in 1870 to
1875, and income per capita in 1929 to 1925. All of our results are robust to dropping the 1875 observation so as
to not use the 1850 estimate of income per capita as the value of lagged income. For all observations, if income
per capita is not available for a particular observation, it is estimated at the lowest aggregation level which it is
available, and the regressions are clustered by the highest aggregation level assigned to a particular country. We
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the regressions using the Pohty measure and a sample of 30 countries for the regressions using
the Przeworski/Boix-Rosato measure. '^'^
In Table 8 we present our fixed effects results with this long run panel. The specifications of
columns 1-3 in Table 8 are identical to the specifications of columns 1-3 of Table 2 over the long
25 year sample where the dependent variable is the Polity index. In columns 4-6, the dependent
variable is the Przeworski/Boix-Rosato index. The results in this table are very similar with
either measure of democracy. Columns 1 and 4 report the basic pooled OLS regressions without
fixed effects. These show the usual findings since income per capita has a positive coefficient and
is strongly significant. Columns 2 and 5 then add the fixed effects, and the introduction of fixed
effects makes income per capita insignificant. In columns 3 and 6, the use of the Arellano-Bond
estimator causes income to have the wrong (negative) sign.
In Table 9 we examine whether there is a relationship between transitions to democracy and
transitions away from democracy in this long run panel using the dichotomous Przeworski/Boix-
Rosato measure of democracy. We again implement the double hazard model introduced in
Section 5.2. As before, we estimate the three possible models with differing degrees of flexibility
in cross-equation restrictions.'''' As in the post-war panel, without fixed effects the effect of
income is large and significant on transitions to democracy and transitions away from democracy.
However, once again when we include fixed effects to control for omitted variables simultaneously
affecting the evolution of income and democracy, the relationship between income per capita
and transitions to and away from democracy becomes insignificant.
The conclusion from this investigation is that the long run historical evolution of countries is
similar to the evolution of countries in the post-1960 sample. Once we control for fixed effects,
there is no significant relationship between income per capita and democracy.
9 Conclusion
There is a general consensus in the empirical political science literature that the modernization
hypothesis provides a good approximation of the relationship between economic growth and
democratization. In particular, most empirical studies conclude that there is a causal effect
of per capita income on democracy, though this may perhaps only work through the process
also assign the 1994 Przeworski/Boix-Rosato democracy score to 2000.
'^'Countries in both samples are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Den-
mark, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela. The sample with Przeworski/Boix-Rosato
measure additionally includes France, Japan, Peru, Portugal, and Spain.
''Specifically, Columns 1 and 2 correspond to the specifications of columns 1 and 2 of panel A of Table 5;
columns 3 and 4 correspond to the specifications of columns 1 and 2 of panel B of Table 5; and columns 5 and 6
correspond to the specifications of columns 1 and 2 of panel C of Table 5.
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of democratic consolidation. In this paper, we argue that, though income and democracy are
positively correlated, there is no evidence of a significant causal eflFect of income on democracy.
Instead, omitted, most probably historical, factors appear to have shaped the divergent political
and economic development paths of various societies, leading to the positive association between
economic performance and democracy.
The previous literature did not reach this conclusion because most papers did not control
for the endogeneity of income per capita. This empirical methodology is potentially problematic
because it fails to control for omitted variables correlated with both income and democracy. This
is particularly concerning, since an alternative hypothesis, the critical junctures theory, implies
that such omitted variables are responsible for the correlation between income and democracy.
We show that when we control for these omitted variables by including fixed effects or by
using other econometric techniques, the effect of income per capita on democracy disappears.
The most plausible interpretation of our findings is that previous research has suffered from
omitted variable biases. We then show that in the sample of former European colonies, where
we have measures of the historical sources of variation in development paths, the fixed effects
indeed capture the impact of historical differences which researchers have shown can account for
economic and institutional divergence.
Our overall conclusion is that the relationship between income and democracy and the widely-
accepted modernization hypothesis need to be reevaluated, with much greater emphasis on the
underlying factors affecting both variables and the political and economic development path
of societies. Our results indicate that countries have embarked upon different development
paths, most likely at some critical junctures during their histories, and while some paths have
led to democracy and prosperity, some others involved non-democracy and relative poverty.
Although democracy and prosperity coevolve along the "virtuous" development path, there is
no evidence that income has a causal effect on democracy conditional on the development path.
Consequently, there is no reason to expect income changes over 5, 10 or even 20 year intervals
observed during the post-war era to lead to significant changes in regimes above and beyond
those experienced by the world as a whole. Though this conceptual approach differs from that
proposed by Lipset (1959) and intensively pursued by the empirical literature, it is close to that
developed by Moore (1966) and elaborated by many non-quantitative scholars.
Our results should not be interpreted as implying that historical factors (or time-invariant
factors captured by fixed effects) are the only or the major determinant of democracy today.
There is a large amount of variability in democracy across countries that is not explained by our
historical variables and also a substantial amount of over-time variability in the democracy score
of a country that still needs to be understood and accounted for. For example, it remains true
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that over time there is a general tendency towards greater incomes and education, and increased
pohtical participation across the world. In our regressions, time effects capture these general
(world-level) tendencies. Our estimates suggest that these world-level movements in democracy
are unlikely to be driven by the causal effect of income and education on democracy. Just what
is causing them is a subject for future research. One possibility, for example, is that there are
important diffusion effects (see for instance, Simmons and Elkins, 2004) so that the democracy
level of one country interacts with that of its neighbors.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
All countries
(1)
Former
Colonies
High Income
Countries
Low Income
Countries
(2) (3) (4)
Freedom House Measure
of Democracy
0.55
(0.36)
0.47
(0.34)
0.74
(0.31)
0.35
(0.29)
Polity Measure
of Democracy
0.54
(0.38)
0.47
(0.36)
0.75
(0.34)
0.34
(0.31)
Przeworski Measure
of Democracy
0.43
(0.49)
0.32
(0.47)
0.68
(0.47)
0.18
(0.38)
Log GDP per Capita 8.14 7.82 9.01 7.27
(Chain Weighted 1996 Prices) (1.03) (0.89) (0.58) (0.51)
Constraint on the Executive
at Independence
i
0.40
(0.35)
Independence Year 1918
(63)
Log Population Density in 1500 0.45
(1.58)
Log Settler Mortality 4.76
(1.24)
Observations 822 557 411 411
Values are averages during sample period, with standard deviations in parentheses, where the sample is from 1960-2000 and
data is included in five year intervals. All countries are those for which democracy—using all three potential measiu'es—and
income per capita in five-year intervals are available at least once during 1960-2000. Column 1 refers to the world sample, and
column 2 refers to the sample of former colonies. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample in column 1 by the median income (from
Penn World Tables 6.1) in the sample of column 1. Freedom House Measure of Democracy is the Political Rights Index,
augmented following Barro (1999). Polity Measure of Democracy is Democracy Index minus Autocracy Index from Polity IV.
Przeworski Measure of Democracy is from Boix-Rosato (2001). GDP per capita in 1996 prices with PPP adjustment is from
the Penn World Tables 6.1. Constraint on the Executive at Independence is from Polity. Year of independence is from the CIA
World Factbook. Log Population Density in 1500 is from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002). Log Settler Mortality is
from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Former colonies is the subsample colonized by European powers before
1900. For detailed definitions and sources, see Appendix Table Al
.

Table 2
Fixed Effects Results using Democracy
Base Sample, 1960-2000
5-year data Annual data 5-year data
Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond
Pooled OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A Dependent Variable is Freedom House Measure ofDemocracy
Democracy
,.,
0.703 Q311 0.489 [0.00] 0.362 0.508
(0.036) (0.052) (0.085) (0.056) (0.093)
Log GDP per Capita
,.i 0.073 0.008 -0.129 [0.33] -0.038 -0.153
(0.010) (0.034) (0.076) (0.042) (0.133)
Log Population,., -0.019
(0.083)
0.016
(0.119)
Education,.! -0.012
(0.019)
-0.025
(0.024)
Observations 955 955 838 2896 685 589
Countries 150 150 127 148 96 92
R-squared 0.72 0.79 0.93 0.76
Panel B Dependent Variable is Polity Measure ofDemocracy
Democracy
,.i 0.748 0.447 0.590 [0.00] 0.453 0.633
(0.034) (0.063) (0.106) (0.068) (0.112)
Log GDP per Capita
,.[ 0.053 -0.003 -0.351 [0.53] -0.006 -0.229
(0.010) (0.038) (0.127) (0.044) (0.186)
Log Population,.,
J
0.160
(0.081)
0.156
(0.106)
Education
,_,
-0.028
(0.021)
-0.027
(0.028)
Observations 856 856 747 3705 643 541
Countries 136 136 114 134 93 91
R-squared 0.77 0.82 0.96 0.80
Panel C Dependent Variable is Przewoi'ski Measure ofDemocracy
Democracy
,.,
0.679 0.318 0.457 [0.00] 0.293 0.389
(0.046) (0.058) (0.092) (0.062) (0.106)
Log GDP per Capita
,.,
0.097 0.051 -0.017 [0.77] 0.052 0.107
(0.018) (0.055) (0.138) (0.088) (0.233)
Log Population,., 0.066
(0.144)
0.301
(0.206)
Education,., -0.012
(0.045)
-0.045
(0.040)
Observations 862 862 792 3720 619 524
Countries 123 123 118 119 95 93
R-squared 0.67 0.76 0.92 0.75
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2, 4. and 5,
with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Columns 3 and 6 use GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust standard
errors; in both columns we instrument for income using a double lag. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Freedom House Measure of
Democracy in panel A; Polity Measure of Democracy in panel B; and Przeworski Measure of Democracy in panel C. Base sample in columns 1, 2, 3, 5. and 6 is an
unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-l=1955); column 4 uses
annual data from the same sample. In column 4, each right hand side variable has five annual lags; we report the p-value from an F-test for the joint significance of all 5
lags. For detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table Al.

Table 3
Fixed Effects Results using Transitions to Democracy
Base Sample
,
1960-2000
5
-year data Annual data 5-year data
Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond
Pooled OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A Dependent Variable is Freedom House Measure of Transitions to Democracy
Democracy
,.| 0.820 0.656 0.761 [0.00] 0.634 0.738
(0.024) (0.031) (0.049) (0.035) (0.057)
Log GDP per Capita
,_,
0.021 0.019 -0.022 [0.30] -0.009 0.033
(0.007) (0.023) (0.046) (0.025) (0.075)
Log Population
,_,
-0.003
(0.045)
0.083
(0.065)
Education
,.[ -0.013
(0.012)
-0.033
(0.020)
Observations 955 955 838 2896 685 589
Countries 150 150 127 148 96 92
R-squared 0.84 0.88 0.96 0.86
Panel B Dependent Variable is Polity Measure of Transitions to Democracy
Democracy n 0.851 0.674 0.813 [0.00] 0.668 0.829
(0.023) (0.043) (0.061) (0.049) (0.066)
Log GDP per Capita
,., 0.015 -0.016 -0.237 [0.11] -0.013 -0.056
(0.008) (0.031) (0.073) (0.032) (0.106)
Log Population
,.,
/
0.130
(0.052)
0.176
(0.069)
Education n -0.029
(0.014)
-0.045
(0.022)
Observations 856 SS6 747 3705 643 541
Countries 136 136 114 134 93 91
R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.97 0.87
Panel C Dependent Variable is Przeworski Measure of Transitions to Democracy
Democracy t.j 0.842 0.582 0.753 [0.00] 0.568 0.721
(0.027) (0.042) (0.064) (0.047) (0.079)
Log GDP per Capita
,.i 0.040 0.009 0.009 [0.91] 0.012 0.220
(0.014) (0.042) (0.112) (0.059) (0.174)
Log Population (.[ 0.034
(0.087)
0.274
(0.134)
Education
,.] -0.027
(0.029)
-0.080
(0.035)
Observations 862 862 792 3720 619 524
Countries 123 123 118 119 95 93
R-squared 0.77 0.84 0.95 0.84
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2, 4, and 5,
with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Columns 3 and 6 use GIVIM of Arellano and Bond ( 1 99 1 ), with robust standard
errors; in both columns we instrument for income using a double lag. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Freedom House Measure of
Transitions to Democracy in panel A; Polity Measure of Transitions to Democracy in panel B; and Przeworski Measure of Transitions to Democracy in panel C, where the
construction of the variables is described in Section 5.1 of the text. Base sample in columns 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 is an unbalanced panel, 1960-2000, with data at 5-year
intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-l = 1955); column 4 uses annual data from the same sample. In column 4, each
right hand side variable has five annual lags; we report the p-value from an F-test for the joint significance of all 5 lags. For detailed data definitions and sources see Table
1 and Appendix Table A 1
.

Table 4
Fixed Effects Results using Transitions away from Democracy
Base Sample
,
1960-2000
5-year data Annual data 5-year data
Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond
Pooled OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A Dependent Variable is Freedom House Measure of Transitions away from Democracy
Democracy
,.,
0,882 0.721 0.728 [0.00] 0.729 0.770
(0.022) (0.035) (0.056) (0.037) (0.055)
Log GDP per Capita ^ 0.052 -0.011 -0.108 [0.19] -0.029 -0.186
(0.007) (0.017) (0.054) (0.026) (0.102)
Log Population,., -0.016
(0.049)
-0.067
(0.085)
Education,.! 0.001
(0.011)
0.008
(0.014)
Observations 955 955 838 2896 685 589
Countries 150 150 127 148 96 92
R-squared 0.90 0.92 0.97 0.91
Panel B Dependent Variable is Polity Measure of Transitions away'from Democracy
Democracy
,.1 0.898 Q.lll> 0.776 [0.00] 0.786 0.805
(0.022) (0.040) (0.067) (0.039) (0.067)
Log GDP per Capita,., 0.038 0.013 -0.114 [0.34] 0.006 -0.172
(0.008) (0.016) (0.073) (0.027) (0.120)
Log Population,.,
J
0.030
(0.047)
-0.020
(0.073)
Education
,., 0.001
(0.013)
0.017
(0.014)
Observations 856 856 747 3705 643 541
Countries 136 136 114 134 93 91
R-squared 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.93
Panel C Dependent Variable is Przeworski Measure of Transitions awayfrom Democracy
Democracy
,.,
0.837 0.736 0.705 [0.00] 0.725 0.668
(0.031) (0.044) (0.054) (0.047) (0.061)
Log GDP per Capita,., 0.057 0.042 -0.026 [0.48] 0.040 -0.113
(0.013) (0.028) (0.092) (0.046) (0.168)
Log Population
,.,
0.032
(0.077)
0.027
(0.137)
Education
,.,
•
0.015
(0.024)
0.034
(0.022)
Observations 862 862 792 3720 619 524
Countries 123 123 118 119 95 93
R-squared 0.88 0.91 0.97 0.90
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2, 4, and 5,
with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Columns 3 and 6 use GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991 ), with robust standard
errors; in both columns we instrument for income using a double lag. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Freedom House Measure of
Transitions away from Democracy in panel A; Polity Measure of Transitions away from Democracy in panel B; and Przeworski Measure of Transitions away from
Democracy in panel C. The construction of the variables is described in Section 5.1 of the text. Base sample in columns 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 is an unbalanced panel, 1960-
2000, with data at 5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-l=1955); column 4 uses annual data from the same
sample. In column 4, each right hand side variable has five annual lags; we report the p-value from an F-test for the joint significance of all 5 lags. For detailed data
definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table Al.

Table 5
Hazard Model using Przeworski Measure of Transitions to and away from Democracy
Balanced Panel, 1965-1995
S-year data Annual data
Exponential
Hazard
(1)
Chamberlain
Exponential
Hazard
(2)
Exponential
Hazard
(3)
Chamberlain
Exponential
Hazard
(4)
5
-year data
Chamberlain
Exponential
Hazard
(5)
Panel A: Constrained Model
Log GDP per Capita,.|
Dependent Variable is Transilions lo and away from Democracy
0.412
(0.047)
0.014
(0.099)
0.397
(0.046)
-0.052
(0.095)
-0.044
(0.139)
Log Population,., -0.263
(0.277)
Education,., 0.030
(0.071)
Observations
Countries
735
105
735
105
3180
106
3180
106
588
88
Panel B: Partially Constrained Model
Log GDP per Capita,., on Transitions to Democracy 0.180
(0.039)
Dependent Variable is Transilions to and awayfrom Democracy
-0.050
(0.113)
0.080
(0.028)
-0.157
(0.089)
-0.081
(0.148)
Log GDP per Capita,., on Transitions away from Democracy 0.288
(0.034)
0.056
(0.112)
0.265
(0.026)
0.027
(0.089)
0.017
(0.148)
Log Population,. 0.012
(0.293)
Education,., 0.018
(0.084)
Observations
Countries
735
105
735
105
3180
106
3180
106
588
Panel C: Unonstrained Model
Log GDP per Capita,., on Transitions to Democracy 0.147
(0.049)
Dependent Variable is Transitions to and away from Democracy
-0.101
(0.108)
0.085
(0.029)
-0.112
(0.077)
-0.135
(0,148)
Log GDP per Capita,., on Transitions away from Democracy 0.344
(0.089)
0.341
(0.279)
0.208
(0.049)
-0.010
(0.099)
0,308
(0,336)
Log Population,. 0,017
(0,085)
Education,., 0,219
(0.349)
Observations
Countries
686
105 105
2062
106
2062
106
540
Exponential double hazard model in columns 1 and 3 and Chamberlain exponential double hazard model in columns 2, 4, and 5. Coefficients correspond to average margLnai effects. Robust standard
errors clustered by country in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Przeworski Measure of Democracy. Base sample in columns I and 2 is a balanced panel
1965-1965 with data at 5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t^i965, so t-l = 1960). Column 5 is the same panel for which population and education data
is available. Columns 3 and 4 is a balanced panel 1965-1994 in annual intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent vanable (i.e., t=1965, so t-l = 1964). In columns 1 and 3, in panel
A, the coefficients in equations (5) and (6) are constrained to be identical; in panel B, the coefficient on income is allowed to be different; in panel C, the coefficient on income and time effects are
allowed to be different, in columns 2. 4, and 5, in panel A, the coefficients in equations (8) and (9) are constrained to be identical; in panel B, the coefficient on income is allowed to be different; in panel
C, the coefficient on income, time effects, and country fixed effects are allowed to be different. For detailed data definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table Al. See text for a detailed
discussion of estimation technique

Table 6
Effect of Historical Institutions on Democracy: Former Colonies
Former European Colonies
5-year data
OLS
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
OLS
(4)
OLS
(5)
Panel A
_
Constraint on the Executive at Independence
Independence Year/ 100
Log Population Density in 1 500
Log Settler Mortality
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable is Fixed Effect from panel A column 2 of Table 2
0.308 0.266 0.288
(0.036) (0.042) (0.036)
-0.163 -0.136 -0.142
(0.020) (0.023) (0.021)
-0.045
(0.011)
90
0.15
-0.086
(0.014)
73
0.35
82
0.59
-0.016
(0.008)
-0.017
(0.013)
68
0.69
-0.021
(0.008)
80
0.63
Panel B
Constraint on the Executive at Independence
Independence Year/100
Log Population Density in 1500
Log Settler Mortality
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable is Fixed Effectfrom panel B column 2 of Table 2
z 0.293 0.283 0.266
(0.033) (0.041) (0.034)
-0.147 -0.139 -0.131
(0.018) (0.023) (0.019)
-0.042 -0.017 -0.018
(0.010)
-0.074
(0.013)
(0.008)
0.001
(0.013)
(0.008)
80 70 82 68 80
0.18 0.31 0.59 0.67 0.62
Dependent Variable is Fixed Effect from\ panel C column 2 of Table 2Panel C
Constraint on the Executive at Independence
Independence Year/100
Log Population Density in 1500
Log Settler Mortality
Observations
R-squared
0.276
(0.062)
-0.220
(0.034)
-0.032
(0.017)
83
0.04
-0.077
(0.023)
71
0.14
81
0.39
0.294
(0.084)
-0.221
(0.048)
-0.005
(0.017)
0.012
(0.027)
68
0.39
0.255
(0.065)
-0.228
(0.037)
0.005
(0.015)
79
0.40
Weighted cross-sectional OLS in all columns. Dependent variable in panels A, B, and C is the country fixed effect calculated column 2 of Table 2 in
panels A, B, and C, respectively. Weights correspond to the inverse non-robust standard error of the country fixed effect calculated in column 2 of
Table 2. In all columns, data represents all available values in the former colonies sample, where a country can only enter once. For detailed data
definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table A 1
.

Table 7
Effect of Alternate Historical Factors on Democracy: Former Colonics
Former European Colonies
5
-year data
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A Dependent Variable is Fixed Effect from panel A column 2 of Table 2
Former Colonizer F-test
Religion F-test
[0.54]
[0.55]
Latitude 0.124
(0.104)
Significant Oil Producer 0.000
(0.048)
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation -0.104
(0.042)
Historical Institutions F-test [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations
R-squared
80
0.64
80
0.64
80
0.63
80
0.63
77
0.68
Panel B Dependent Variable is Fixed Effect from1 panel B column 2 of Table 2
Former Colonizer F-test [0.71]
Religion F-test [0.41]
Latitude 0.005
Significant Oil Producer
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation
-0.001
(0.045)
-0.067
(0.042)
Historical Institutions F-test [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations
R-squared
80
0.62
80
0.63
80
O.hl
80
0.62
77
0.65
Panel C Dependent Variable is Fixed Effect frorr7 panel C column 2 of Table 2
Former Colonizer F-test [0.85]
Religion F-test [0.29]
Latitude
Significant Oil Producer
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation
Historical Institutions F-test
Observations
R-squared
-0.023
(0.187)
0.025
(0.087)
-0.132
(0.082)
:o.oo] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
79 79 79 79 77
0.40 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.42
Weighted cross-sectional OLS in all columns. Dependent variable in panels A, B. and C is the country fixed effect calculated column 2 of Table 2
in panels A, B, and C, respectively. Weights correspond to the non-robust standard error of the country fixed effect calculated in colunm 2 of
Table 2. In all columns, data represents all available values in the former colonies sample, where a country can only enter once. Constraint on the
Executive at Independence, Independence Year/100, and Log Population Density in 1500 are included in all columns but not displayed; the
historical institutions F-test reports the p-value for their joint significance. Former colonizer F-test reports the p-value for the joint significance of
British, French, and Spanish colony dummies which are included but not displayed in column 1 . Religion F-test reports the p-value for the joint
significance of fraction Catholic, fraction Protestant, and fraction Muslim which are included but not displayed in column 2. For detailed data
definitions and sources see Table 1 and Appendix Table A 1
.
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Appendix Table A2
Fixed Effecls Results: Investigating Londregan and Poole (1996)
Londregan and Poole Sample, 1952-1985
Table 3, Londregan
& Poole (1996)
(1)
Fixed Effects OLS
(2)
Fixed Effects OLS
(3)
Fixed Effects OLS
(4)
Fixed Effects OLS
(5)
Dependent Variable is Democracy
Democracy n
Log GDP per Capita F-test
Log GDP per Capita t.i
Log GDP per Capita Growth,
Log GDP per Capita Growth
,.]
Transition
Nonconstitutional Leader
Leader is a Prime Minister
Leader had a Military Career
Time Since Leader Came to Power
Leader has a CMIP
Time Remaining in Leader's CMIP
Leader's CMIP Expires This Year
Leader's Age/10
Time Effects F-test
Residual AR(1) Test
Observations
Countries
R-squared
0.848
(0.014)
2798
0.96
0.848
(0.015)
[0.00]
0.858
(0.014)
[0.00]
0.858
(0.031)
[0.12]
[0.04]
[0.00]
[0.32]
0.119 0.119 0.117 0.126
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.080)
-0.305 -0.305 -0.341 -0.302
(0.161) (0.164) (0.164) (0.172) .
-0.027 -0.027 -0.038 0.012
(0.156) (0.159) (0.160) (0.156)
0.197 0.197
(0.069) (0.071)
0.020 0.020 0.009 0.013 0.002
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.062) (0.081)
0.221 0.221 0.226 0.228 0.205
(0.086) (0.088) (0.088) (0.152) (0.213)
0.093 0.093 0.086 0.078 0.093
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.068) (0.082)
-0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.020 -0.020 -0.075 -0.087 -0.151
(0.063) (0.065) (0.062) (0.103) (0.127)
-0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
-0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.025 -0.024
(0,045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.007
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017)
[0.02]
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
2798 2798 2798 2364
100 100 100 99
0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
In both columns 1 and 2, non-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Country dummies are included in all columns. Coliunns 3 and 4 include time effects and
cluster the standard errors (included in parentheses) to account for potential residual serial correlation. Column 5 includes lags of democracy up to t-5 and includes up
to 5 lags of income and removes growth terms so that income variables correspond more closely to the variables we include in Tables 2, column 4. Dependent
Variable: Polity Composite Index (Logistic Transform), from Londregan and Poole (1996). This takes the original Polity score, ranging from -10 to 10, and creates a
variable ln(Polity+10.5)-ln(10.5-Polity) ranging from -3.71 to 3.71. Sample is unbalanced panel from 1952 and 1985, from Londregan and Poole. Log GDP per Capita
Growth is calculated on an annual basis. Column I reports coefficients from Table 3, columns 3 and 4, on p. 19 of Londregan and Poole (1996), which is generated
using maximum likelihood estimation on a two equation model. The Income F-test corresponds to a joint test of the significance of coefficients on all income
variables listed at the top of table in columns 2, 3, and 4. The Democracy F-test does the same for democracy variables. Columns 2-5 include a test of first order
autocorrelation in the residual term; see Wooldridge (2002), section 10.6.3. CMIP stands for constimtionally mandated interelection period. See Londregan and Poole
(1996) for data and definitions.

Appendix Table A3
Codes Used to Represent Countries in Figures
Country Code Country Code Country Code
Andorra ADO Ghana (IHA Netherlands NLD
Afghanistan AFG Guinea GIN Norway NOR
Angola AGO Gambia, The GMB Nepal NPL
Albania ALB Guinea-Bissau GNB New Zealand NZL
United Arab Emirates ARE Equatorial Guinea GNQ Oman OMN
Argentina ARG Greece GRC Pakistan-post- 1972 PAK
Armenia ARM Grenada GRD Pakistan-pre-1972 PAK_I
Antigua ATG Guatemala GTM Panama PAN
Australia AUS Guyana GUY Peru PER
Austria AUT Honduras HND Philippines PHL
Azerbaijan AZE Croatia HRV Papua New Guinea PNG
Burundi BDI Haiti HTI Poland POL
Belgium BEL Hungary HUN Korea, Dem. Rep. PRK
Benin BEN Indonesia IDN Portugal PRT
Burkina Faso BFA India IND Paraguay PRY
Bangladesh BOD Ireland IRL Qatar QAT
Bulgaria BGR Iran IRN Romania ROM
Bahrain BHR Iraq IRQ Russia RUS
Bahamas BHS Iceland ISL Rwanda RWA
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH Israel ISR Saudi Arabia SAU
Belarus BLR Italy ITA Sudan SDN
Belize BLZ Jamaica JAM Senegal SEN
Bolivia BOL Jordan JOR Singapore SGP
Brazil BRA Japan JPN Solomon Islands SLB
Barbados BRB Kazakhstan KAZ Sierra Leone SLE
Brunei BRN Kenya KEN El Salvador SLV
Bhutan BTN Kyrgyz Republic KGZ Somalia SOM
Botswana BWA Cambodia KHM Sao Tome and Principe STP
Central African Republic CAF Kiribati KIR Suriname SUR
Canada CAN St. Kitts and Nevis KNA Slovakia SVK
Switzerland CHK Korea, Rep. KOR Slovenia SVN
Chile CHL Kuwait KWT Sweden SWE
China CHN Lao PDR LAO Swaziland SWZ
Cote d'lvoire CIV Lebanon LBN Seychelles SYC
Cameroon CMR Liberia LBR Syrian Arab Republic SYR
Congo, Rep. COG Libya LBY Chad TCD
Colombia COL St. Lucia LCA Togo TGO
Comoros COM Liechtenstein LIE Thailand THA
Cape Verde CPV Sri Lanka LKA Tajikistan TJK
Costa Rica CRI Lesotho LSO Turkmenistan TKM
Cuba CUB Lithuania LTU Tonga TON
Cyprus CYP Luxembourg LUX Trinidad and Tobago TTO
Czech Republic CZE Latvia LVA Tunisia TUN
Germany DEU Morocco MAR Turkey TUR
Djibouti on Moldova MDA Taiwan TWN
Dominica DMA Madagascar MDG Tanzania TZA
Denmark DNK Maldives MDV Uganda UGA
Dominican Republic DOM Mexico MEX Ukraine UKR
Algeria DZA Macedonia, FYR MKD Uruguay URY
Ecuador ECU Mali MLI United States USA
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY Malta MLT Uzbekistan UZB
Eritrea ERI Myanmar MMR St. Vincent and the Grenadines VCT
Spain ESP Mongolia MNG Venezuela, RB VEN
Estonia EST Mozambique MOZ Vietnam VNM
Ethiopia ETH Mauritania MRT Vanuatu VUT
East Timor ETM Mauritius MUS Western Samoa WSM
Finland FIN Malawi MWI Yemen YEM
Fiji FJI Malaysia MYS Yugoslavia - post 1991 YUG
France FRA Namibia NAM South Africa ZAF
Gabon GAB Niger NER Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR
United Kingdom GBR Nigeria NGA Zambia ZMB
Georgia GEO Nicaragua NIC Zimbabwe ZWE
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